Abstract
Introduction
Recent financial history can be interpreted as a spiral of financial and economic crises, and a set of regulatory responses to them. Over the past few decades this process has shown that the global financial system is adept at establishing alternative legal and quasi-legal spaces that circumvent national systems of taxation and financial regulation. About half of the global stock of money is routed through offshore financial centres (OFCs), many of which are considered to be tax havens.
The vast majority of wholesale banking takes place in unique quasi-legal spaces of the Euromarket and its various descendants. More recently, the global financial crisis of 2007-09 has revealed the scale of the phenomenon of 'shadow banking' (SB), or a complex network of financial intermediation that takes place outside the balance sheets of the regulated banks, and thus remains invisible to the regulatory bodies.
In the USA on the eve of the crisis, the scale of the shadow banking industry was estimated to be one and a half time larger than the 'visible' banking sector. In Europe, recent estimates suggest that SB practices have actually grown in scope after the crisis of 2007-09, while other studies suggest that SB has historically played an important role in the financing of the economy in emerging markets (Ghosh et al 2012; Bakk-Simon et al. 2012) . The two intertwined phenomena of OFCs and SB are drawing attention of the global and national regulators.
Analysing the two phenomena, this work offers a distinct contribution to the study of economic governance processes. On the one hand, the major players shaping the regulatory discussions of offshore and shadow banking are easily identifiable and fit well within the scope of other analyses presented here. These include the core industrialised countries, the US, the EU, the UK and to a lesser extent, at least for the time being, China. They are advised by research arms of their Treasuries, their central banks, as well as other international governing bodies and think tanks, such as the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the OECD.
Consultations and debates unfold under the umbrella of established forums, including the IMF, the BIS, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and Financial Action Task Force (FATF), but also among quasi-public bodies such as the OECD and the G20. Importantly, the players area also accommodates private stakeholders of financial governance, including banks, hedge funds, and international professional services companies (large accounting and law firms and a spate of specialised consultancies). Civil society organisations, such as the Tax Justice Network or Finance Watch, also play a major role. In most existing accounts of structural configurations in finance, the power of the key players and their vested interests are imputed rather than being researched in depth. Yet perhaps unsurprisingly, evidence suggests that the large banks, non-bank financial institutions, accounting and law firms seek to limit regulation, on grounds of cost, scale, efficiency, utility and so on.
Therefore, what is missing in existing analyses of financial power is a clearly defined paradigm of regulation and governance. One major reason for this is the fact the 'black holes' have been largely ignored in mainstream discussions. In it notable in this instance that many key advisory and (some) regulatory bodies such as the BIS, or research departments of the central banks, have for the time-being, managed to escape to a degree the traditional political restraints they encountered in the past. In fact, they have emerged at the forefront of research in, as well as proposed solutions for, for the twin problems of tax and regulatory avoidance. Much of what is known about SB phenomenon is a product of innovatory work of a group of researchers, initially at the Federal Reserve, led by Zoltan Poszar, who then moved to the IMF and is currently a senior adviser to the U.S. Treasury. The Bank of England practically gave a free hand to Andrew Haldane for blue-sky thinking about regulation and the purpose of banking today. Claudio Borio, a senior economic at the BIS, a staunch critic of deregulated finance before the crisis, emerged as powerful thinker in the post-crisis regulatory scene. These and other research units are behaving, for now, as is expected of them: they are relatively open minded, prepared to entertain a diversity of opinions and theoretical paradigms. Yet at this stage it is unclear for how long this trend will continue.
The work supports our own earlier analysis (Nesvetailova & Palan 2010) which suggested that the so-called neoliberal paradigm has bifurcated between private and public facets of governance. Private actors, by and large, 1 continue to believe, or at least publicly promote, the conventional neoliberal notions about the balance between the public and the private, the state and the market. Whereas public governing bodies have long abandoned the neoliberal paradigm, relying instead on a pragmatic choice of regulatory tools and most recently, on economic stimuli that contradict the orthodoxy (McCulley and Pozsar 2013) . The size and importance of offshore and SB raises further philosophical questions concerning the legitimacy, relevance and efficiency of the solutions that are being proposed.
Aggressive tax avoidance perpetrated by multinational corporations, rich individuals and banks are now high on the public agenda. The casino-like behaviour of the financial industry is source of consternation and ridicule. Any proposal to regulate these two realms is likely to be received well. At this point, however, we cannot predict how effective the proposed solutions might be.
In the short space allowed by this work we can only present a sketch of the ongoing efforts for a global regime of regulation of these ongoing efforts. This is partially because of the complexity of the issue, partially because the new principles and approaches to governing financial innovation are in discussion stages, with many proposals remaining as points of contention, internationally and nationally.
Here it is noteworthy that while the authorities in the EU and the USA, and the international financial institutions such as the IMF and the BIS have launched serious consultations on the regulation of these quasi-legal financial spaces; the attitude of 1 With few notable exceptions, such as financier George Soros.
China and other rising powers to these proposals remains unknown. In what follows, this work discusses the state of play and current plans for the governance of tax havens, offshore finance and the shadow banking industry.
Accounting For the Black Holes of the World Economy
Existing debates on international financial governance tend to focus on the role of official structures and institutions in overseeing global financial stability and managing crises. Rarely do debates on governance and regulation take specific account of the so-called 'black holes' of the global economy, namely, offshore financial havens and the shadow banking system. However the statistics associated with offshore financial hubs and the scope of shadow banking practices suggest these financial 'black holes' play a central role in today's global economy. In one way or another, about half of the global stock of money passes through offshore jurisdictions, which is equivalent to about one third of all global FDI (Palan, Murphy and Chavagneux, 2010) . Recent estimates place the amount of accumulated wealth registered in offshore havens at about $US 21 trillion, or at nearly 18% of the aggregate global wealth (as opposed to global GDP, estimated at around $US70 trillion) (Henri 2012) .
The figures for the shadow banking industry are no less staggering. According to the data from the Federal Reserve, in 2007, on the eve of the global financial meltdown, the size of SB in the USA was $18 trillion, or $6 above the volume of the regulated banking system. In the aftermath of the crisis, the volume of shadow banking system has gone down to an estimated $15.8 trillion (Pozsar et al 2010) .
Recent data from the Financial Stability Board (FSB) puts the size of the global SB at around $67 trillion at the end of 2011, or what is about half of all bank assets worldwide (FSB 2012).
The regulatory challenges posed by these quasi-legal financial spaces are enormous. Neither economic theory nor policy instruments were designed to handle these phenomena. Economic policy is designed to deal with the world as interpreted by economic theory. Yet a world economy that consists of diverse sovereign entities, each with its own government, political systems, institutions and structures, and each having the right to write their own laws, is very different from the abstractions used in standard economics (Palan 2013 This business of regulatory avoidance, otherwise known as financial innovation, is now considered one of the main purposes of international finance. Regulatory bodies are only beginning to take account on these trends.
The quest for post-tax profits is linked to another important idea, or habit of thought, of mainstream tradition in political science and economics. 'There are no free lunches', Milton Friedman famously argued. In economics there is nothing that is 'free,' since somebody has to pay for it. That may true, but an alternative economic paradigm, known as evolutionary institutionalism, is predicated on the assumption that was captured by Giovanni Dosi: 'there are always a lot of free lunches, provided you are able to discover and grab them' (Dosi 1991, 6) . In other words, there are many opportunities out there, and both opportunities and penalties are not allocated equally or democratically among people and businesses. Economic actors seeking to maximise post-tax profit might not be as concerned with improving their competitive position or raising efficiency or productivity as suggested by standard economics. Instead, they tend to spend much time and money seeking to grab any free lunches available.
To over-simplify somewhat, the rise of the offshore world and shadow banking industry can be seen as a history of the discovery, often by accident, of opportunities or 'free lunches' that have existed because the world economy operates in a striated space of the state system. Regulation of such 'free lunches' is an exceedingly difficult problem. Regulatory paradigms have had difficulties incorporating notions of such free-lunches; predictably, the impact of regulations in the financial and tax sphere had tended to produce a spate of unintended consequences. One positive aspect of current discussion is that the current debate on regulation of the two spheres aims to consider seriously such possible unintended consequences.
Tax Havens and Offshore Finance
Modern tax havens have existed since the early twentieth century. They were used, and are still used, primarily but not exclusively, for tax evasion and avoidance purposes. Tax havens are used, however, for other purposes as well. Since the early There is some confusion between the concept of tax havens and OFCs, and is not only a matter of semantics. The different conceptions of the two terms go to the very heart of what is considered to be the problem (or not) with OFCs. Some experts see no difference between tax havens and OFCs, and employ the terms interchangeably. The term OFC or even IFC (International Financial Centre) is employed simply because it is less offensive than tax havens. Yet, historically, the two terms were distinct. Modern 'tax havens' are known to have existed at least since the beginning of the twentieth century. Offshore financial centres, in contrast, are a more recent phenomenon that became current only around the mid 1970s (Bryant, 1983) . They are broadly defined as markets in which financial operators are permitted to raise funds from non-residents and invest or lend the money to other non-residents free from most regulations and taxes. Most commonly, the designation 'offshore' financial market is used to describe the wholesale international financial market, previously known as the Eurodollar market.
The contrasting views of the role of tax havens as OFCs derive to a degree from the different understandings of nature of the offshore financial markets, the Euromarket. Some very distinguished economists believe that the Euromarket is simply a wholesale financial market for U.S. dollar that emerged in Europe in the 1950s (Schenk 1998) . The term 'offshore' implied the original the location of the market outside the territorial boundaries of the U.S. Over time, the Euromarket came to denote any location of trades in non-resident 'hard' currencies such as the British Sterling, the Yen, the Swiss Franc, the Deutsche Mark and the Euro. OFCs, according to this thesis, are financial centres specialising in non-resident finance. As however, in this understanding the Euromarket is not distinct from any other market, there are no special characteristics to OFCs; as the majority, if not all, of world's financial centres tend to handle both resident and non-resident currencies, they all in fact, can be described as OFCs.
There is a very different theory which claims that the Euromarket is a very specific type of market that emerged in late 1957 in London (Burn 2005) . According to this theory, the Bank of England came to an informal agreement with the City's merchant banks to treat certain type of financial transactions between non-resident parties and denominated in foreign currency as if they did not take place in London, even though they were in London. Paradoxically, the bank created, in effect, a new regulatory space outside its jurisdiction, and a new concept -offshore finance. But as the transactions that took place in London were deemed by the Bank of England to be taking place elsewhere, they ended up under no regulation at all, or offshore.
These transactions, according to this theory takes place in a new unregulated space called the Euromarket, or the offshore financial market (Burn 2005) .
Experts who subscribe to this thesis sometimes call the Euromarket a booking device because it has no existence outside the accounting books of banks and financial institutions. Such 'offshore' spaces are created when the books of foreignto-foreign accounts are kept separate from the books for domestic financial and capital transactions (or 'on-shore'). The essential point is that offshore financial markets are unique, not because of the non-resident currencies that are traded on their platforms, but because those exchanges escape nearly all forms of supervision, regulation and, often, taxation. This theory suggests that OFCs punched a hole at the very core of the international regulatory map, a hole that must be addressed by current plans for revisions of the international regulatory architecture.
As far as we can tell, the original rationale for the development of the Euromarket had little to do with taxation. British banks developed the market as a way of coping with the new regulation imposed by the British Treasury. The
Euromarket remained small and practically unknown for three or four years until U.S.
banks discovered it in the early 1960s. By late 1950s, some of the US banks were among America's and the world's largest banks, but due to these regulations 'even the largest of them individually possessed no more than about 3 per cent of US bank assets' (Sylla 2002, 54 Because they fly below the radar of traditional bank regulation, these levered-up 2 Bermuda, which is the largest captive insurance centre in the world, but has a relatively small banking center, can be included as well, as indeed, Cyprus and the more numerous but less significant former British colonies in the Pacific. The first comprehensive study of the US shadow banking system was published in late 2010 and quickly became a classic (Pozsar et al. 2010) . The study mapped the structure of shadow banking in the US context, distinguishing between government-sponsored, internal and external shadow banking sub-systems (Pozsar 2010: 30-36) . 5 The study estimated that, the size of SB activities in the USA was about $6trillion larger than the official banking system of the country. closely (8% each) (FSB 2011b) . At the same time, analysts at all levels admit that because so many of the practices of shadow banking remain obscure and take place under the regulators' radar, current data on shadow banking activities may be under-estimations.
5 Similar to the "internal" shadow banking sub-system (which evolved historically in parallel to the moves away from deposit-based banking to original and distribute model of banking), as banks sought to the "external" shadow banking sub-system was a global network of balance sheets, with the origination, warehousing and securitization of loans conducted mainly from the U.S., and the funding and maturity transformation of structured credit assets conducted mainly from the U.K., Europe and various offshore financial centers. However, unlike the "internal" sub-system, the "external" sub-system was less of a product of regulatory arbitrage, and more a product of vertical integration and gains from specialization (Pozsar et al 2010: p. 36) . 6 The Netherlands has a large and sprawling OFC. Evaluations of the impact of the shadow banking system on the global economy vary. Most current studies view SB as an integral part of the global credit 7 Credit transformation refers to the enhancement of the credit quality of debt issued by the intermediary through the use of priority of claims. For example, the credit quality of senior deposits is better than the credit quality of the underlying loan portfolio due to the presence of junior equity. Maturity transformation refers to the use of short-term deposits to fund long-term loans, which creates liquidity for the saver but exposes the intermediary to rollover and duration risks. Liquidity transformation refers to the use of liquid instruments to fund illiquid assets. For example, a pool of illiquid whole loans might trade at a lower price than a liquid rated security secured by the same loan pool, as certification by a credible rating agency would reduce information asymmetries between borrowers and savers (Pozsar et al 2010: 8) .
chain. Techniques and instruments of disintermediation and securitisation, it is argued, help banking groups minimise costs, achieve efficiency gains and diversify their portfolios (Pozasr et al. 2010) . Others argue that the obscurity of SB entities and practices add to uncertainty and lack of knowledge about the true financial state of many companies, contributing to the growth of offshore financial havens and 'secrecy spaces.'
Why has the phenomenon of SB emerged in recent times? Many current perspectives offer a functional perspective on these questions, diagnosing the phenomenon as an outcome of regulatory arbitrage in the financial system. Here, the Fed study notes that while the interconnectedness of official and shadow banking structures is not problematic in itself, some elements of this linkage became sources of fragility because they reflected three specific types of arbitrage: (1) cross-border regulatory systems arbitrage, (2) regulatory, tax and economic capital arbitrage, and (3) ratings arbitrage (Pozsar et al 2010: 29) . These arbitrage opportunities in turn, arose out of the fractured nature of global financial regulation; the dependence of capital adequacy rules (Basel II) on credit ratings; and a series of uncoordinated decisions by accounting and regulatory bodies regarding the accounting and regulatory capital treatment of certain exposures and lending and asset management activities (Pozsar et al 2010: 29-30) .
Historical approaches to financial innovation suggest that shadow banking is more than a functional facet of modern finance. The search for new financial and legal space, and therefore financial innovation through off-balance sheet vehicles and operations, fulfils growing demand for funding otherwise unavailable within the constraints of the official (regulated) banking system. Here, several studies have analysed the increased role of repo markets in providing financing for companies (Adrian et al. 2011; Krishnamurthy et al. 2012) , while other scholars and regulators have noted the acute problem of scarcity of high-quality collateral that is sought after by a multitude of institutional investors (Pozsar and Singh 2011; Moe 2012 ) . While the debate about the legal and economic foundations of shadow baking is set to continue for quite some time, it is clear that the deep-seated origins of this phenomenon go beyond the regulatory domain of banking, and pertain to the core questions about the balance between financial and 'real' economies, and to the way credit intermediation works in a capitalist system geared towards futurity (Palan 2013 C&C) .
Regulatory Efforts

Tax havens
The years 1998-2000 saw the beginning of a new phase in international efforts to combat tax havens. A coordinated three-pronged attack was pursued by separate international organizations at a multilayer level. The more significant developments in the battle against secrecy and tax havens were pursued, however, separately, by the EU and the US. The OECD developed its campaign against harmful tax competition at the request of the G7, the FSF tackled financial stability, and the FATF money laundering. There were already close links between the FATF and the OECD, not least because the FATF secretariat is located at OECD headquarters in
Paris. An OECD report published in 2000 charted linkages between bank secrecy, money laundering, and tax evasion.
Initially, the most significant development in the battle against tax havens came in 1998 with the publication of a landmark OECD report entitled 'Harmful Tax
Competition: An Emerging Global Issue' (OECD 1998). We will focus our attention on the OECD's efforts which are still at the forefront of the multilateral efforts to tackle tax havens. Tax havens were described by the OECD rather forcefully as 'free riders of general public goods created by the non-haven country ' (1998, 15) and 'poachers' (1998, 16) . The OECD went so far as to invent a new 'industrial sector' to describe them, noting that 'many havens have chosen to be heavily dependent on their tax industries' (1998, 10)-"tax industries" being a creative term for 'rent'.
The OECD is a think tank. In could do little more than build up peer pressure by 'naming and shaming', as it was called, states that practice harmful tax competition. The key to the OECD process was a promised list of non-cooperative jurisdictions, to be released by the end of 2001. Ominously, the 1998 report recommends that its members adopt serious defensive measures against noncooperative countries. The OECD recognizes that Switzerland and Luxembourg are tax havens but seems to be unwilling or unable to force them to change their policies.
The first OECD campaign proved a failure for a number of reasons. Primarily, due to conceptual difficulties in defining clearly harmful tax practices as opposed to the typical program of complex tax rules, tax holidays and targeted subsidies practices by most advanced industrialized countries. Furthermore, some members of the OECD, such as Switzerland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the US and the UK, are also considered tax havens. The OECD had no recommendations how to deal with those. For all those reasons the OECD campaign against harmful tax competition was whittled down by 2004 (Sharman 2006) . The OECD announces the campaign a complete success, declaring that all states were removed from its black list, and moved on quietly to the next set of programs.
The failure of the concept of harmful tax competition has convinced the OECD that a different angle was needed. There was a simple and obvious argument to be made. If tax havens were not different from any other countries, and if they were regulated and responsible members of the international community as they have argued, why then is there a need for secrecy? Legitimate business should be able to stand to scrutiny. The OECD shifted its attention, therefore, to what Richard Murphy described as 'secrecy locations', seeking to break down the wall of secrecy and opacity that were constructed by tax havens.
There is a debate as to how to go about it. Many have argued that only a system of automatic exchange of information among countries can resolve the abuse perpetrated by tax havens. In such systems countries will routinely pass on information on foreign holders of banking accounts, companies, trusts, etc. to their respective countries of origins. As to be expected, automatic exchange agreements While some isolated destabilising practices that led to the crisis of 2007-09 would be tamed under such an approach, the ultimate effect of these moves remains unknown. Singh (2012) for instance, has argued that the effort to shift OTC derivatives trade from the banks' books onto organised clearing houses will simply create a new 'too big to fail' problem in global finance. In a new, 'cleared' world of derivatives trade, risk will simply be shifted from individual banks to new institutions similar to concentrated "risk nodes" in the financial system, while existing regulatory apparatus is not adept at dealing with resolution of such systemic risk nodes in times of stress or crisis. Generally, it is fair to say that this line of regulatory focus on the problem of shadow banking is underpinned by the ultimately benign view of financial innovation generally. Indeed, the problem that needs to be targeted, according to these proposals, is not financial instability or financial innovation per se, but the workings of the individual parts of the financial system that have malfunctioned in the preceding economic cycle.
At another level, a more serious academic and policy debate about the linkages between SB units and structures and the channels of the official banking system, has only just begun ( Second, the core challenge in any comprehensive governance plan is to understand financial innovation and its connectivity with the elements of the economic system, a task which is not helped by the current state of mainstream economics and the continuing crisis in the Eurozone. Third, any type of a radical financial reform tends to be seen by the financial community as constraining the field of profit-making, thus firing up political sensitivities of any regulatory agenda. At the same time, in 2012 Adair Turner noted that "[g]iven the enormous cost which instability can produce, and given the uncertain benefits which this complexity has delivered, our regulatory response should therefore entail a bias to prudence -a bias against complex interconnectivity, against procyclical market contracts, and against allowing maturity transformation or high leverage to develop in unregulated institutions or markets" (Turner 2012 Cass: p 36).
The viability of such a prudent, and radical, approach to financial governance ultimately related to a more general issue about the underlying paradigm of 2-3). In this framework, any policy towards regulation of shadow banking needs to centre on the question of the relationship between private and public debt and debt management. As Borio continues, this recognition in turn, suggests that an effective management of post-crisis stagnation or depression, an active strategy should centre on the idea of substituting public sector debt for private sector debt. This is based on the public sector's superior ability to bring forward (real) resources from the future, underpinned by its power to tax (e.g. Holmström and Tirole (2011).
However the greatest hurdle towards a world of more accountable financial innovation is that despite the change in tone, the regulatory efforts of financial architects are constrained by the political environment of the yesteryear.
Represented most vividly by the political regimes in the UK and Germany, but also by national economic policies that continue to be built on the benign view of financial innovation (and by association, private financial leverage that had been magnified through shadow banking), and an a priori negative understanding of the role of public debt in the economy. Unless this dogmatic view is reversed, the practices of shadow banking, and financial fragility driven by them, will continue to thrive in the economy otherwise stricken by a protracted recession.
Conclusion
The crisis of 2007-09 and its aftershocks have revealed a series of structural, institutional and functional problems caused by financial innovation. Many of the problems pertain to the notion of systemic risk in finance today, and the way the costs of financial crises are externalised from the private sphere of the financial markets to the public realm of the economy and society. The crisis in particular has cast light on two important, yet until recently hidden, dimensions of the contemporary financial system: the global economy of tax havens and offshore finance, and the complex web of entities and practices that has been dubbed, the shadow banking system.
The governance of these black holes of the global economy constitutes one of the most difficult challenges confronting regulators and policymakers. In this work,
we have reviewed some of the key initiatives currently being discussed at national and global levels of financial policy-making. The 'black holes' of the contemporary financial system do not only pose intellectual and practical challenges to policymakers and regulators, but also to academics analysing the nature of the global economy. In an environment where many scholars are habituated to think in a particular way about the world we inhabit, we find the evolution of such alternative, often virtual spaces, disconcerting.
Our analysis suggests that any regulatory move aiming towards a more effective regulation of offshore finance and shadow banking requires a formidable degree of expertise about the operation and functions of these financial realms. In our opinion, a number of research departments at the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, the BIS and the ECB, but interestingly, less so the IMF and the World Bank, emerged as leaders in both gathering information and producing innovatory, out of the box thinking about the current dilemmas. Still, perhaps due to institutional biases, in most popular accounts, the two phenomena are treated as somewhat marginal to the core processes of economic globalisation, crisis management and economic regulation. Despite the staggering data associated with the amount of capital accommodated in offshore finance and shadow banking structures, current debates in economics and political science reflect this vision.
One of the most crucial steps towards a better regulation of these financial black holes lies in finding an alternative analytical framework that would allow us to understand the real linkages between, and within, the economy, financial system and its shadow components. Economic orthodoxy, as this work has suggested, is unable to offer such vision. There are very few signs of any comprehensive attempt at dealing with the complexities of financial regulation in the age of financial innovation. At the time of writing (winter 2012/2013), it is also not entirely clear whether OFCs and shadow banking will be part of the new regulatory architecture. If they are not, then the emerging system of global financial regulation is doomed to fail.
